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BEYOND EQUALITY AND 
DISCRIMINATION† 
Martha Albertson Fineman* 
ABSTRACT 
The societal frame of the “economically disadvantaged” is rooted in a distinction between 
a conceptual status of equality and the actuality of discrimination and disadvantage. This 
paradigm provides the governing logic for both criticism and justification of the status quo. 
This Article questions whether and to what extent this equality/antidiscrimination logic 
has lost its effectiveness as a critical tool and what, if anything, should be the foundation 
of the rationale that supplements or even replaces it. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The theme of this Article for the SMU Law Review Forum focuses us on the 
challenges faced by the “economically disadvantaged” in the past decade and in 
the future. This framing is rooted in a distinction between that conceptual status 
of equality and the actuality of discrimination and disadvantage. This is the lens 
through which contemporary legal culture tends to assess the nature and effect of 
existing laws and determines the necessary direction of reform. As such, this 
paradigm provides the governing logic for both criticism and justification of the 
status quo. It is rooted in an understanding of the significance of the human being 
and a belief in their fundamental parity under law that also asserts the inherent 
value of individual liberty and autonomy, and thus is skeptical of state 
intervention into the “private” sphere of life. 
I believe that one of the most significant questions for the twenty-first century 
for those concerned with “the disadvantaged” has to be whether and to what 
extent this equality/antidiscrimination logic has lost its effectiveness as a critical 
tool and what, if anything, should be the foundation of the rationale that 
supplements or even replaces it. To raise questions about the current dominant 
paradigm is not to argue that equality and antidiscrimination are not important 
or necessary concepts. Equality and antidiscrimination were unarguably essential 
 
 † Portions of this Article are based on a previous piece by the author. See Martha Albertson 
Fineman, Vulnerability and Social Justice, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 341 (2019). [Ed.’s Note]. 
 * Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law and Founding Director of the Vulnerability 
Initiative, Emory University and Leeds University (U.K.). 
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steps in the evolution of a just society. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, formal 
rules, as well as functioning norms, were built on assertions of fundamental 
differences among groups defined by gender, race, and other characteristics. These 
distinctive group categories also established a world of hierarchical, legalized 
identities in which some were susceptible to different, often demeaning 
treatment. However, with the formal distinctions now removed and equal access 
the norm,1 it becomes apparent that the problems in society often transcend 
discrimination and exclusion from social institutions. Indeed, there may be 
substantial problems with those institutions and their organization not revealed 
by the jurisprudential logic that flows from an equality/antidiscrimination 
paradigm, which may place obstacles on the ability to remedy (or even address) 
existing inequalities.2 
An equality model or nondiscrimination mandate certainly remains the 
appropriate response in many instances: one person, one vote, and equal pay for 
equal work are areas where equality seems clearly suitable. However, equality is 
less helpful—and may even be an unjust measure—when applied in situations of 
inescapable or inevitable inequality where differing levels of authority and power 
are appropriate, such as in defining the legal relationship between parent and 
child or employer and employee. Such relationships have historically been 
relegated to the “private” sphere of life—whether family or market—away from state 
regulation. 
When explicitly addressed, situations of inevitable inequality are typically 
handled in law and policy either by imposing a fabricated equivalence between 
the individuals or by declaring that an equality mandate does not apply because 
the individuals to be compared are positioned differently.3 An example of the 
imposition of fictitious equality in response to inevitable inequality is evident in 
situations involving parties who occupy obviously unequal bargaining positions, 
like the contract that is fabricated in the employment context.4 The distinction in 
the legal treatment of children as compared with adults also exemplifies a 
differently positioned resolution for unequal legal treatment. In both instances, 
state responsibility for ensuring equitable treatment for differently positioned 
 
 1. This argument is developed more fully in Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability and 
Inevitable Inequality, 4 OSLO L. REV. 133 (2017). 
 2. This is reflected in the difficulties with affirmative action and other “remedial” plans that 
propose unequal treatment in order to address existing inequalities. See Martha Albertson Fineman, 
Equality and Difference – The Restrained State, 66 ALA. L. REV. 609, 626 (2014). 
 3. Moreover, equality implies a comparison that leads to the problematic question: Equal to 
whom? In the case of women, are male norms and standards the appropriate measure? Such an 
assimilationist approach to equality presumes socially and culturally imposed roles—obligations and 
burdens are similar or equal in nature as regards women and men. If this is not the case, equal 
treatment will often result in further consolidation of existing, unequal power relationships, 
effectively reinforcing the very gender system that feminists oppose. In addition, the idea of “choice” 
may suggest to some that existing inequalities show not a failure of equality per se but are simply the 
result of different life choices freely made by “autonomous” men and women. If women choose to 
devote more time to family and relationships, rather than investing their energies in the labor market, 
the resulting gender disparities are merely the neutral result of differing choices made by equally 
autonomous and free adults. See generally id. 
 4. These are typically contracts of adhesion or involve corporate entities and individuals in a 
situation with a predictable inequality of knowledge, bargaining power, and access to legal resources. 
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individuals is minimized or obscured within the overriding framework of 
equality.5 
II.  RETHINKING THE PARADIGM—VULNERABILITY THEORY 
Law is both inherently a social endeavor and a primary instrument of 
accomplishing social justice. Laws establish and regulate duties, obligations, 
rights, and privileges applicable to all members of a society, as well as define 
relationships with each other and with the state and its institutions. Politicians 
and philosophers addressing the role and function of law can and do differ when 
it comes to theories of governance, but there should be a shared recognition of 
the significance of our understanding of what it means to be human. Laws are 
drawn with a created legal subject in mind—an imagined ordinary being who is 
the abstract subject of law.6 Our ideas about what it means to be human and how 
the state or collective should be constructed influence how we shape legal 
relationships and social institutions, as well as inform what we consider to be 
justice within those arrangements and institutions.7 This dialectical relationship 
between the empirical and the ideal is a starting point to apprehend the law not 
as mere reflection of society but as constitutive of the material forces which guide 
its own reproduction.8 
Our contemporary legal subject is posited as an autonomous and independent 
being whose primary demand is for liberty or freedom from state interference.9 
He claims a right to autonomy to govern his own life while at the same time 
asserting his freedom from responding to the needs of others, who should be 
equally independent and self-sufficient.10 This Enlightenment vision of legal and 
 
 5. On reflection, it becomes apparent that many, if not most, social or institutional 
relationships are relationships of inherent inequality. See Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable 
Inequality, supra note 1, at 134–35. 
 6. Defining this is a matter of selecting what are essential human qualities, which can then be 
used to set expectations and aspirations attainable under a rule of law. 
 7. See, e.g., HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 2 (1967) 
(explaining how the method of social theorists differs from natural scientists and the importance of 
acknowledging the network of concepts). 
 8. In this endeavor, I am indebted to the framework provided by Merton’s “theories of the 
middle range,” in the sense that they are “intermediate to general theories of social systems which are 
too remote from particular classes of social behavior, organization and change to account for what is 
observed and to those detailed orderly descriptions of particulars that are not generalized at all.” 
ROBERT K. MERTON, On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range, in ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY: 
FIVE ESSAYS, OLD AND NEW 39, 39 (1967). 
 9. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality]. 
 10. I intentionally use the male pronoun here because the political subject that governs our 
current institutional imagination is based on a limited notion of the human experience—one that 
reflects the understanding of the male, white, property-owning or tax-paying, of a certain age and/or 
religion and free framer of the U.S. Constitution. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, certain qualifiers were removed, and political legal subjectivity formally grew to encompass 
previously excluded groups. However, this eighteenth-century legal subject continues to influence the 
modern legal subject. “He” retains many of the secondary characteristics that formed perceptions of 
the needs and political sensibilities of an eighteenth-century male citizen sheltered by institutions 
such as the patriarchal family and the privileges of a master-servant mentality. See generally Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 1713 (2012). 
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political subjectivity has given us legal concepts such as the “reasonable man” and 
also forms the basis for the rational, self-interested agent in economic theory.11 
The liberal legal subject embodies an ideal of abstract equality or fundamental 
sameness where any differences among men are deemed to be legally or politically 
insignificant. 
This liberal legal subject is a fully functioning adult in charge and capable of 
making choices. Unrestrained by the state, he will be rewarded according to his 
particular talents and individual efforts. His social relations are defined by 
concepts, such as consent, and supported by legal doctrines, such as contract and 
property.12 The attainment of liberal economic roles, such as job creator, 
entrepreneur, taxpayer, and (of course) consumer, defines the aspirations and 
determines the values for this legal subject. The messy aspects of what it means to 
be human, particularly the physical realities of vulnerability and dependency, may 
be viewed as a problem, but they are strictly considered to be an individual, not a 
societal, problem. Thus, such problems are deemed a personal, rather than public, 
responsibility.13 
“Vulnerability theory” challenges this limited and inaccurate vision of legal 
subjectivity. It suggests that a legal subject that is primarily defined by vulnerability 
and need, rather than exclusively by rationality and liberty, more fully reflects the 
human condition. As such, vulnerability theory has the power to disrupt the logic 
of personal responsibility and individual liberty built on the liberal stereotype of 
an independent and autonomous individual. Recognition of human vulnerability 
mandates that the neoliberal legal subject be replaced with the vulnerable legal 
subject, even as a responsive state is substituted for the restrained state of liberal 
imagination.14 
The rethinking of legal subjectivity and state responsibility is an important 
social justice project. When we place the vulnerable subject at the center of our 
theorizing, it becomes clear that there is a collective or social injury that inevitably 
arises from a state unresponsive to the universal and constant human condition 
of vulnerability and dependency.15 The injury arises from profound negligence or 
disregard on the part of the state to attend to human vulnerability in creating its 
 
 11. This liberal legal subject is based in the Lockean notion on equality of the same inalienable 
natural rights. See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 9, at 2–3. This is also the basis for law and 
economics theories that came to dominate in the late twentieth century and is commonly associated 
with the economic philosophy of the “Chicago School.” See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed. 2014). For the influence of the law and economics movement 
in the United States, see DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 41–76 (2011). For a critique from 
feminist scholarship, see FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, & SOCIETY 
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005). 
 12. Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 1419–21 
(2001). 
 13. See id. at 1405–06. 
 14. Fineman, Equality and Difference, supra note 2, at 626; Fineman, Vulnerability and Inevitable 
Inequality, supra note 1, at 149. 
 15. Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, 
in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 13, 
21 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Greer eds., 2013); Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 266–69 (2010). 
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institutions and defining the social relationships that will govern society.16 
Vulnerability theory is also a legal project that will bring all areas of law, not just 
those focused on civil rights, under social-justice scrutiny. 
A.  WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE HUMAN? 
Vulnerability theory began by asking a fundamental question: What does it 
mean to be human?17 In answering this question, we must identify the essential 
aspects of human beings—those characteristics, experiences, or situations that are 
universal and define the human condition.18 The answer to this question in 
vulnerability theory is, of course, vulnerability. Vulnerability is located in the fact 
that we are embodied beings. Our bodies are inevitably and constantly susceptible 
to changes—both positive and negative, developmental, and episodic over the life 
course, and this has implications for our social well-being as well.19 Note that 
human vulnerability is not set forth as a normative concept. It is descriptive, 
representing irrefutably empirical observations about the nature and substance of 
the embodied human experience. 
As embodied beings, humans constantly experience changes over time, which 
include not only the possibility of bodily harm, injury, or decline but may also be 
positive and generative. For example, developmental changes for an individual 
can lead to increased strength, growth, wisdom, and maturity, as well as provoking 
creativity and relationships of fulfillment and satisfaction. On a societal level, the 
reality of our susceptibility to bodily change over time necessitates the creation of 
relationships of care and caring upon which we are dependent20 as infants and 
 
 16. Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics, supra note 15, at 
20–21. 
 17. See id. at 21. Vulnerability theory draws a distinction between what is the essence of the 
human condition (which reflects the biological and developmental realities of our bodies) and how 
we understand human nature (which is largely a product of history, geography, and culture—in other 
words, it varies over time and place and is socially produced). 
 18. Vulnerability theory posits vulnerability as universal and constant but also recognizes that 
there are differences among individuals. “Horizontal” differences are observed if we take a slice of 
society at any given time and note the differences in embodiment, such as race, gender, ability, and 
other differences. There are also differences in social standing and status. These differences do not 
alter the fundamental vulnerability that marks all bodies but have certainly served to provoke 
profound social advantage or disadvantage. Thus, horizontal differences have been the main subject 
of antidiscrimination and inclusion laws. An additional set of differences may be thought of as 
“vertical”—occurring within each individual over the life course as we move from infant to elderly. 
These differences are not well-addressed in law and theory. Typically, children and some elderly or 
disabled individuals are clustered into “vulnerable populations” and stigmatized as either in need of 
protection or lacking capacity, creating a “special” legal identity for those within the group. Other 
“vulnerable populations,” such as at-risk youth, may be subjected to discipline or punishment. This 
Article will not explore the reconciliation of the universal vulnerable subject with what I have called 
the “paradox” of particularity, but those interested in this aspect should see Fineman, Equality and 
Difference, supra note 2, and Martha Albertson Fineman, Vulnerability, Resilience, and LGBT Youth, 23 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 307 (2014). 
 19. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, in TRANSCENDING BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL 
THEORY 161, 166–70 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011). 
 20. I view both vulnerability and dependence as universal, reflecting the shared human 
condition that mandates that, of necessity, we are social beings. These terms do not designate 
individuals as aberrant and deficient but, quite the contrary, exemplify the human condition. 
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children, as well as the social institutions and relationships upon which we are 
inevitably enmeshed as adults.21 
While vulnerability theory begins with vulnerability, it does not end there. In 
fact, it is the implications of human vulnerability that are the most significant part 
of the theory for legal and political thought. Because we are embodied creatures, 
we are also dependent on social institutions and relationships throughout the life 
course. 
B.  INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN VULNERABILITY 
Ultimately, of more significance to the development of the theory than the 
description of human vulnerability is a second theoretical question, one that has 
normative implications: If to be human is to be universally and constantly 
vulnerable, how should this recognition inform the structure and operation of 
our society and its institutions? To answer this question, it is necessary to reflect 
initially upon the whole idea of society, its purpose, and its justification. Reflecting 
a dawning neoliberal perspective, Margaret Thatcher, in a 1987 interview in 
Women’s Own Magazine, famously proclaimed there was no such thing as society: 
They are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there’s no such 
thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. 
And no government can do anything except through people, and people 
must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and 
then, also, to look after our neighbours.22 
Clearly, she was making a political, not a sociological, statement reflecting her 
view on state responsibility (or lack thereof). However, the idea of society and how 
it functions in critical theory is not always obvious, and it is important to explicitly 
reveal the assumptions that are made. We know societies are not all the same, but 
they may nonetheless have universal, shared characteristics. What are they? 
Obviously, any society has to be intergenerational if it is going to perpetuate itself. 
Every society needs a means of organizing itself and establishing the rules that will 
guide individual interactions with each other, as well as establishing the 
appropriate relationship between the individual and the state. In addition, every 
society must, of necessity, devise social institutions and relationships that respond 
to the realities of the human condition, which means responding to human 
vulnerability and dependency.23 
These two assertions about society are at the heart of vulnerability theory. The 
social institutions and relationships that a society forms must transcend not only 
the specific interests of particular individuals and groups but must also have 
 
 21. The point is that although the institutions and relationships upon which we depend change 
over time—from family to educational and employment systems, for example—the reality of our social 
dependency is constant. 
 22. Margaret Thatcher: A Life in Quotes, GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2013, 8:38 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/apr/08/margaret-thatcher-quotes 
[https://perma.cc/7P7S-Z7W7]. 
 23. As we have seen, contemporary politics has dictated the market and its institutions as the 
mechanism to provide for human needs, as well as preserving individual liberty. See infra Section II.C. 
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concern for the intergenerational needs of society. This societal perspective 
defines a preeminent social justice challenge. Vulnerability theory teaches us that 
human beings are all inevitably embedded within the social—located throughout 
our lives in particular systems of social organization. The social nature of those 
institutions and relationships form the basis for state or collective responsibility. 
This responsibility cannot initially or primarily be understood only in terms of 
individual well-being. Social justice responsibility must be intergenerational and 
directed to the systems of institutions and relationships developed by a society to 
maintain general human well-being and flourishing.24 We cannot adequately 
assess what is just on an individual or group basis without considering the justice 
of the fundamental social order. The societal problems of general organization 
and order must define state responsibility in the first instance. 
In defining this collective responsibility, the collective reality of human 
vulnerability and the physical and social dependency that it inevitably generates 
must be of central concern. In particular, the social implications of dependency 
are vitally important in defining state responsibility.25 Dependency is most evident 
when we are infants and children, but while we may be more or less dependent at 
any given stage, it is present in some form and to some degree throughout our 
lives.26 
C.  SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND RESILIENCE 
Understanding vulnerability as inevitably arising from our embodiment and 
inescapably necessitating the creation of social institutions should make it clear 
that there is no position of either invulnerability or independence. Fortunately, 
however, there is resilience. Resilience is centrally important in a vulnerability 
analysis. Resilience is not a naturally occurring and variable characteristic of 
individuals. Nor is it achieved only by individual accomplishment and effort. 
Rather, resilience is a product of social relationships and institutions. Human 
beings are not born resilient. Instead, resilience is produced over time, within 
social structures, and under societal conditions over which individuals may have 
little or no control.27 
Resilience is found in the material, cultural, social, and existential resources 
that allow individuals to respond to their vulnerability (and dependencies).28 
 
 24. Distortions within the system, such as impermissible discrimination, can be addressed after 
the general functioning is determined to be justice. 
 25. Dependency is the realization or actualization of human vulnerability and can come in 
economic, physical, psychological, or other institutional forms. Dependency has typically been used 
as a highly stigmatized term, particularly in the context of “welfare reform.” Dependency and the idea 
of cycles of intergenerational dependency were used to justify draconian cuts to an already meager 
safety net for poor women and their children in the United States. However, single mothers who 
attained that status through divorce could look to their ex-husbands for resources, remaining 
dependent on him rather than the state. Nonetheless, the gendered social roles and expectations 
within the family affected the way women were seen and received in society, independent of their 
own family situation or motherhood status. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The 
Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2204–06 (1995). 
 26. See id. at 2200–01. 
 27. See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 15, at 269–73. 
 28. The list of resources is an expansion on the list of assets developed in Fineman, Anchoring 
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Resilience is measured by an individual’s ability to survive or recover from harm 
or setbacks that inevitably occur over the life course. Resilience has positive 
manifestations as well. Resilient individuals can form relationships, undertake 
transactions, take advantage of opportunities, or take risks in life—confident that 
if they fail the challenge or meet unexpected obstacles, they are likely to have the 
means and ability to recover. In other words, resilience allows us to respond to 
life—not only to survive but also to thrive within the circumstances in which we 
find ourselves. 
Institutions are the mechanisms whereby individuals can accrue the resources 
they need to have resilience. The fact that a vulnerability analysis brings the life 
course into focus is also important. Resilience-conferring institutions operate both 
simultaneously and sequentially in society. That they are sequential is significant 
because it illuminates how failing to gain resources or resilience successfully in 
one stage can fundamentally affect the ability of an individual to succeed in 
another. An inadequate education will impair the ability to secure employment 
and accumulate material goods, which will also affect things later in life, like 
health, family formation, and prospects in old age. The movement into a new 
phase depends on successful accomplishment of the tasks set in the earlier stage, 
and it may be difficult to recover if that does not happen.29 
The fact that institutions operate simultaneously is also significant when 
thinking about resilience. The family, the market, the financial and educational 
systems, and so on are the intersecting institutions where we accumulate the 
material, cultural, social, and existential resources that give us resilience as 
individuals. Therefore, resilience gained through one institutional or relational 
arrangement can offset or mitigate disadvantages in others (and vice versa). For 
instance, strong family compensates for weak education, while violent or abusive 
family undermines advantages of strong education.30 
While it may not be explicitly focused on the vulnerability of human beings, 
the current political order is not dismissive of the need for social institutions.31 
Policy pronouncements, legislative histories, party platforms, and political 
rhetoric have routinely recognized and celebrated the important position and 
function of institutions and institutional roles in society.32 Economic or market 
 
Equality, supra note 9, at 13–15, based on the four types of assets identified in PEADAR KIRBY, 
VULNERABILITY AND VIOLENCE: THE IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION (2006). In discussing resilience, 
Kirby builds on earlier definitions that understood resilience as “enabling units such as individuals, 
households, communities and nations to withstand internal and external shocks.” Fineman, 
Anchoring Equality, supra note 9, at 13 n.34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KIRBY, supra, 
at 55). 
 29. See Martha Albertson Fineman & George Shepherd, Homeschooling: Choosing Parental Rights 
over Children’s Interests, 46 U. BALT. L. REV. 57, 83–88 (2016). 
 30. See Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 9, at 15–16. 
 31. Liberal political rhetoric reflects a greater recognition that governmental assistance is 
necessary when it comes to provision of basic needs like health care and education than its more 
conservative counterparts. However, both guard and preserve the public-private divide. 
 32. See generally DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS 
OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012) (showing the relevance of political and economic 
institutions for development); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: 
HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 
(2011) (exploring the relationship of political institutions to inequality and wealth concentration). 
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institutions are lauded as producing the economic well-being of society, and the 
individuals controlling them are cast as wealth and job creators—entrepreneurs 
paving the path for economic growth and prosperity for the entire nation.33 The 
family is praised for its role in raising the next generation of citizens and caring 
for those at the end of life. Parents are lauded for their self-sacrificing actions, and 
the self-sufficient (marital) family is valorized as both a moral and an economic 
ideal, uniquely qualified to attend to dependency and the needs of its members.34 
The political and policy perception is that these institutions, among others, 
have a central and essential role in organizing and reproducing society, as well as 
providing for individuals—which serves as the rationale for protecting them from 
state interference.35 Obviously, this perception that institutions are necessary is 
correct. However, we must modify the current political dogma that places these 
institutions within a “private sphere,” distinguishing them from a public arena in 
which state action and responsibility are the norms. The failure to recognize the 
public purpose of these institutions (and the corresponding public responsibility 
for them) is not only misguided but also detrimental to the functioning of society 
and the welfare of many individuals within it. 
That these constructed entities are deemed “private” institutions—even though 
we enact laws to facilitate their creation; determine their shape, terms, and 
responsibilities; and ease their functioning—is a paradox.36 They are creatures of 
 
 33. Particularly in modern capitalist societies, i.e., market-oriented economies, private 
corporations are the main actors in deciding what, when, and how much economic well-being is 
produced and also are our main employers and taxpayers. In the words of Lindblom, they are a kind 
of “public official[,]” considering that “jobs, prices, production, growth, the standard of living, and 
the economic security of everyone all rest in their hands.” CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND 
MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 172 (1977) (emphasis added). 
 34. The family is the quintessentially “private” institution—the sphere that is theoretically 
protected from intervention by the state. However, paradoxically, it is also a heavily regulated entity, 
with the state (through law) defining what the core family connection is and who may attain it under 
what circumstances. The state also defines the consequences of family relationship and controls the 
exit as well as the entrance into those relationships. I have discussed the invisibility of dependence 
within the family and the need for a collective responsibility towards care in MARTHA ALBERTSON 
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY 
TRAGEDIES (1995). 
 35. See generally Janet Halley, What is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
1, 1–6 (2011) (providing an overview of the development of “family law exceptionalism”); Janet 
Halley, What is Family Law? A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 189, 189–95 (2011) (arguing 
that family law fundamentally differs from the “market” and its laws). 
 36. Robert Dahl observed that “without the protection of a dense network of laws enforced by 
public governments, the largest American corporation could not exist for a day.” GAR ALPEROVITZ 
& LEW DALY, UNJUST DESERTS: HOW THE RICH ARE TAKING OUR COMMON INHERITANCE 138 
(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST 
DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. CONTROL 184 (1982)). Dahl also noted that the view of economic 
institutions as “private” is an “ill fit” for their “social and public” nature. Id. at 139 (quoting DAHL, 
supra, at 185); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, 
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 15 n.5 (2000) (“The 
characterization of the market in this public/private scheme is interesting. It is cast as public vis-à-vis 
the family, but private vis-à-vis the state, seeming to gain the advantage of each category. In this regard, 
it is interesting to note that when the comparison is of market versus family, the ‘private’ sphere of 
the family is subject to heavy public regulation, mostly because it retains aspects of ‘status’ and is not 
governed by contract. In contrast, the ‘public’ arena of the marketplace is governed by bodies of 
designated ‘private’ law, such as contract. These contrary characterizations have ideological 
nuances.”). 
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law, brought into being by doctrines set out in corporate, family, property, 
corporate, employment, tax, trade, welfare, and other laws. The law determines 
the nature of the relationships between individuals within these essential social 
institutions, such as parent-child, employer-employee, shareholder-consumer, and 
so on.37 
Creation of social institutions and relationships also involves defining the 
relationship between the state, the institutions it creates in law, and the 
individual. Laws and legal principles form or constrain the ongoing scope of state 
responsibility for social institutions once they have been created. In the United 
States, the idea of ongoing state responsibility is viewed as an exception when it 
comes to social institutions, particularly the market or family. For example, in the 
business arena, the notions of the “free market” and the “efficiency” inherent in 
competition are raised consistently as barriers to state regulation and oversight.38 
We have fashioned doctrines of “family privacy” and “parental rights” that deter 
government participation in significant and consequential decisions affecting the 
present and future well-being of children.39 This default position of the “private” 
ordering system for essential societal institutions must be adjusted by recognizing 
the necessity of ongoing public monitoring of and oversight for these institutions. 
This oversight and advocacy for needed adjustments should be primary focuses of 
social justice scholarship. 
By shaping essential social institutions and the relationships within them, the 
law dictates the basic organization of society, allocating power and privilege as well 
as determining the means for individual and societal well-being. Both individuals 
and society are ultimately dependent on the successful and fair operation of 
society’s institutions. The relationship between the individual and society is 
symbiotic and mutually dependent. As indicated in the preceding section, the 
concept of derivative dependence is important here. If we are to fulfill the social 
roles we occupy within society, we must be able to rely on its institutions. If society 
is to flourish, it must rely on the success of the institutions and individuals who 
comprise it. Individual and collective reliance on social relationships and 
institutions mandate that the state monitor these essential social arrangements 
and make adjustments when they are not operating equitably. This includes those 
 
 37. For this reason, these are examples of laws that should be consistently and rigorously 
examined with principles of social justice in mind. Vulnerability theory refers to these relationships 
as social identities. They express societal expectations that govern the interaction and consequences 
within institutions. See generally Jonathan Fineman, A Vulnerability Approach to Private Ordering 
Employment, in VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK 13 (Martha Albertson 
Fineman & Jonathan W. Fineman eds., 2018) (for employment context). It is also important to see 
how social identities may intersect in unjust ways. For example, how does the social role defined for 
the employee conflict with that defined for the parent? Note that this is not a traditional identity-
based analysis. It is not the gender of the employee that is relevant, but the societal task associated 
with the social role (caretaker versus employee). 
 38. Politicians use arguments of liberty, equality, and contract in drafting the legal terms and 
consequences of employment as primarily of private concern. See id. at 14–15. The same principles 
are used to support the organization of corporate relationships so as to thwart regulations and 
oversight. 
 39. One example of how a vulnerability analysis might address this is found in Fineman & 
Shepherd, supra note 29, at 57. 
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institutions that are now classified as private, as well as those deemed public.40 At 
most, social institutions can only be considered to be quasi-private. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Vulnerability theory, built around our shared vulnerability and dependence, 
illuminates why we first need to consider general legal institutions and 
relationships in determining social justice. By placing the vulnerable subject at the 
center of its inquiry, vulnerability theory requires critical inquiry beginning with 
a consideration of how society generally structures its institutions and 
relationships through law and policy. In urging us to do this before looking at 
how specific individuals or groups fare within those social arrangements, the 
theory seeks to define and apply a legislative or administrative set of decision-
making ethics rather than setting forth a cluster of individual rights to 
entitlements.41 Vulnerability theory is more focused on establishing the 
parameters of state responsibility for societal intuitions and relationships than it 
is on setting the limits of state intervention. 
In taking this approach to state responsibility, vulnerability theory expands our 
notion of what constitutes an injury of constitutional significance to include the 
gross neglect or willful disregard of circumstances of profound deprivation and 
unmet need on the part of some citizens.42 If social institutions and relationships 
are formed to respond to human vulnerability and dependency, then human 
vulnerability and dependence should form the foundation of our social compact. 
This societal perspective is very different from that found in traditional social 
contract theory in defining state responsibility. Traditional social contract 
concepts are based on the idea that rational and autonomous individuals consent 
to cede some of their naturally endowed liberty to the (restrained) state in 
exchange for mutual protection in a Hobbesian world.43 By contrast, vulnerability 
theory recognizes state responsibility as arising from the human needs organically 
rooted in universal vulnerability and dependency. State responsibility, initially 
manifested in the creation of social organization and rules, must continue to 
monitor and reform those institutions if they are going to succeed consistent with 
principles of social justice. 
Importantly, a vulnerability approach to social justice recognizes that the 
relationship between the individual and the society is synergetic and, thus, 
ongoing. Resilience-conferring institutions operate in integrated and sequential 
ways within society, and individual success depends on the successful integration 
and operation of those institutions. The role of social institutions for the 
 
 40. See generally Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 36. 
 41. This does not mean that an antidiscrimination analysis is not ever appropriate. It is merely 
an argument about inclusiveness and positioning in critical thought. If one begins by defining a 
problem as one limited to discrimination, the resolution is inclusion of the excluded individual or 
group. The general nature and functioning of the social institution and relationships contained 
within it may then be neglected or ignored. See Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-
Discrimination Law in the Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1059, 1106–07 (2017) (employment context). 
 42. See Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, supra note 15, at 274 n.77. 
 43. The fact that some individuals will succeed and even thrive in this type of Hobbesian world 
is not surprising; they do so by exploiting and dominating others, including governing structures. 
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individual also suggests a corresponding societal dependence on the collective 
successes of those individuals. Just as no individual can successfully stand apart 
from the state and its institutions, the destiny of the state ultimately relies on the 
actions of the individuals who constitute it. The reproduction of a just society 
requires that law and policy construct and sustain an adequately responsive state—
one that is grounded in vulnerability theory, addresses the range of dependencies 
inherent over the life course, and is attentive to all stages of development and 
forms of need of the vulnerable subject. 
